[PR #236] [MERGED] Update dependency jinja2 to v3.1.5 [SECURITY] #233

New issue

TheLovinator · 2026-09-02T13:09:54+02:00

TheLovinator commented

2026-09-02 13:09:54 +02:00

📋 Pull Request Information

Original PR: https://github.com/TheLovinator1/discord-twitter-webhooks/pull/236
Author: @renovate[bot]
Created: 12/24/2024
Status: ✅ Merged
Merged: 12/24/2024
Merged by: @renovate[bot]

Base: master ← Head: renovate/pypi-jinja2-vulnerability

📝 Commits (1)

278df2c Update dependency jinja2 to v3.1.5 [SECURITY]

📊 Changes

1 file changed (+3 additions, -3 deletions)

View changed files

📝 poetry.lock (+3 -3)

📄 Description

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
jinja2 (changelog)	`3.1.4` -> `3.1.5`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-56201

A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used.

To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename.

CVE-2024-56326

An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.

To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.

Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.

Release Notes

pallets/jinja (jinja2)

`v3.1.5`

Compare Source

Unreleased

Calling sync render for an async template uses asyncio.run.
:pr:1952
Avoid unclosed auto_aiter warnings. :pr:1960
Return an aclose-able AsyncGenerator from
Template.generate_async. :pr:1960
Avoid leaving root_render_func() unclosed in
Template.generate_async. :pr:1960
Avoid leaving async generators unclosed in blocks, includes and extends.
:pr:1960

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Stockholm, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

_{🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.}

## 📋 Pull Request Information **Original PR:** https://github.com/TheLovinator1/discord-twitter-webhooks/pull/236 **Author:** [@renovate[bot]](https://github.com/apps/renovate) **Created:** 12/24/2024 **Status:** ✅ Merged **Merged:** 12/24/2024 **Merged by:** [@renovate[bot]](https://github.com/apps/renovate) **Base:** `master` ← **Head:** `renovate/pypi-jinja2-vulnerability` --- ### 📝 Commits (1) - [`278df2c`](https://github.com/TheLovinator1/discord-twitter-webhooks/commit/278df2c2ddebc585ab7113bb8c6306151ae785e6) Update dependency jinja2 to v3.1.5 [SECURITY] ### 📊 Changes **1 file changed** (+3 additions, -3 deletions) <details> <summary>View changed files</summary> 📝 `poetry.lock` (+3 -3) </details> ### 📄 Description This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | [jinja2](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja) ([changelog](https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/changes/)) | `3.1.4` -> `3.1.5` | [![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/jinja2/3.1.5?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![adoption](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/adoption/pypi/jinja2/3.1.5?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![passing](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/compatibility/pypi/jinja2/3.1.4/3.1.5?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/jinja2/3.1.4/3.1.5?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2024-56201](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-gmj6-6f8f-6699) A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename. #### [CVE-2024-56326](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h) An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>pallets/jinja (jinja2)</summary> ### [`v3.1.5`](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/blob/HEAD/CHANGES.rst#Version-315) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/compare/3.1.4...3.1.5) Unreleased - Calling sync `render` for an async template uses `asyncio.run`. :pr:`1952` - Avoid unclosed `auto_aiter` warnings. :pr:`1960` - Return an `aclose`-able `AsyncGenerator` from `Template.generate_async`. :pr:`1960` - Avoid leaving `root_render_func()` unclosed in `Template.generate_async`. :pr:`1960` - Avoid leaving async generators unclosed in blocks, includes and extends. :pr:`1960` </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Stockholm, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/TheLovinator1/discord-twitter-webhooks).  --- <sub>🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.</sub>

TheLovinator

2026-09-02 13:09:54 +02:00